



## **Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill**

### **Briefing for Report Stage House of Lords**

**June 2011**

#### **For further information contact**

Sally Ireland, Director of Criminal Justice Policy  
email: [sireland@justice.org.uk](mailto:sireland@justice.org.uk) direct line: 020 7762 6414

JUSTICE, 59 Carter Lane, London EC4V 5AQ tel: 020 7329 5100  
fax: 020 7329 5055 email: [admin@justice.org.uk](mailto:admin@justice.org.uk) website: [www.justice.org.uk](http://www.justice.org.uk)

## Introduction

1. JUSTICE is a British-based human rights and law reform organisation, whose mission is to advance justice, human rights and the rule of law. JUSTICE is regularly consulted upon the policy and human rights implications of, amongst other areas, policing, criminal law and criminal justice reform. It is also the British section of the International Commission of Jurists.
2. This briefing is intended to highlight JUSTICE's main concerns regarding the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill for House of Lords Report Stage. Where we have not commented upon a certain provision in the Bill, this should not be taken as an endorsement of its contents.
3. We welcome the repeal of ss132-138 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (demonstrations in the vicinity of Parliament) in clause 143 of the Bill. Our concerns about the Bill's provisions at this stage focus upon the following areas:
  - **There are insufficient checks on the powers of Police and Crime Commissioners, particularly in relation to their relationship with Chief Constables and any misconduct by Commissioners themselves;**
  - **Schedule 6 to the Bill gives the Secretary of State almost complete control over the membership of Police and Crime Panels;**
  - **Provisions relating to the restriction of activities in Parliament Square are overbroad; the need to seek authorisation to use a loudspeaker or loudhailer may interfere with the legitimate use of such devices by organisers to marshal peaceful protests;**
  - **Removal of requirements for representation on the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs may compromise its independence and expertise;**
  - **The proposal that the Director of Public Prosecutions should consent to the issue of private arrest warrants in international criminal cases is unnecessary and contrary to the international rule of law.**

## **PART 1 - POLICE REFORM**

### **Police and Crime Commissioners**

4. Under clauses 6 and 7 of the Bill, Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and the London Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPC) would issue policing and crime plans, which would set out (as per clause 8(1)), inter alia, 'the policing of the police area which the chief officer of police is to provide', 'the financial and other resources which the elected local policing body is to provide to the chief officer of police' and 'the means by which the chief officer of police's performance in providing policing will be measured'. PCCs will therefore have a very high degree of control over chief constables' functions and budgets.
5. Under clause 39 of the Bill, PCCs will appoint, and may suspend or call for the resignation or retirement of, the chief constable for the relevant force area. The Police and Crime Panel (PCP) will have a veto over appointments of chief constables according to the provisions of Schedule 8 but will only be able to make recommendations in relation to calls for retirement or resignation and has no role in relation to suspensions.
6. JUSTICE is seriously concerned that the creation of PCCs could result in a competitive 'race to the bottom' on populist law and order policies which may not be effective to reduce crime and may result in the neglect of 'invisible' crimes such as domestic violence in favour of crimes which dominate public concern such as street crime and anti-social behaviour. While the Home Secretary will issue the 'strategic policing requirement' under clause 80 of the Bill, to which chief officers must have regard, this document will relate to 'national threats', that is (according to clause 80(6)):
  - (a) a threat to national security, public safety, public order or public confidence that is of such gravity as to be of national importance, or
  - (b) a threat which can be countered effectively or efficiently only by national policing capabilities to counter the threat.

While this may be adequate in relation to offences in the context of terrorism and organised crime requiring a national policing response, we remain concerned that matters such as domestic violence and abuse; child neglect; aggravated crimes against minorities; or even ordinary crimes such as fraud and environmental offences which do not feature high on the list of crimes of acute concern to the public may not feature in the

strategic policing requirement and may not be a priority for PCCs, resulting in them being, comparatively, neglected in terms of funding and attention.

7. Further, we are concerned that misconduct by police and crime commissioners cannot effectively be addressed under the Bill's provisions. Clause 31 provides for the suspension of a commissioner in the event of his/her being charged with an offence carrying a maximum sentence exceeding two years' imprisonment; this is in our view far too high a threshold. Complaints procedures and investigation of complaints are left by Schedule 7 largely to regulations.
8. We are also concerned about Schedule 6 relating to police and crime panels, which would result in the Secretary of State having near total control over membership of those bodies. We are particularly concerned at the prospect of panels appointed under Part 3 of the Schedule, which would be made up of appointees of the Secretary of State plus two members co-opted by the panel. We question the value of panels appointed under Part 3 of Schedule 6 and in particular the extent to which they will ensure pluralism of perspective or local accountability for the police and crime commissioner. We also question why all police areas in Wales will have PCPs appointed under Part 3 of the Schedule (paragraph 2).

#### Suggested amendment

**Page 50, line 3 [clause 80], insert:**

**“( ) a threat from criminal activity directed at children, vulnerable adults, or members of minority groups, and/or from offences committed in the context of domestic violence, abuse or neglect;”**

This amendment to the strategic policing requirement aims to prevent crimes against minorities and vulnerable people including domestic violence from being given insufficient attention under the new policing system.

### **PART 3 - PARLIAMENT SQUARE GARDEN AND SURROUNDING AREA**

9. JUSTICE strongly welcomes the repeal of the authorisation regime for demonstrations in the vicinity of Parliament under the Serious Organised Crime and

Police Act 2005 and the recognition that this gives to the importance of peaceful protest in the vicinity of Parliament. When the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill was going through Parliament we said that: '[i]n light of the weight given to the protection of political speech under Article 10 of the Convention, we are particularly concerned at measures that seek to inhibit public protest on the doorstep of Parliamentary democracy itself. It seems an unpleasant irony that, should these provisions become law, freedom of expression will be most at risk in the one place where it should be most protected.'<sup>1</sup>

10. We are concerned, however, that the Bill creates a prior authorisation requirement in relation to the use of loudspeakers and loudhailers. As we said when briefing on the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill, such equipment can be necessary by organisers of larger demonstrations in order to marshal demonstrators and for example, keep a march on a prescribed route and therefore comply with conditions laid down by police under the Public Order Act 1986. We therefore question why it is necessary to seek authorisation from the Greater London Authority/Westminster Council in relation to use of such devices, and why a constable or authorised officer should be able to direct that a person not use such devices under clauses 145-146 in circumstances where their use is not excessive in duration or unreasonably loud. We are particularly concerned that such a wide-ranging power should be granted to 'authorised officers'; coercive powers of this type, if they are to be created, should be restricted to police officers, who have a duty to uphold the law and from whom members of the public are more likely to accept such directions peacefully.
11. Demonstrations in response to often fast-moving events sometimes have to be organised at short notice in order to be effective and the 21 day authorisation period provided for noise-making equipment in clause 149 is therefore too long. Further, there are no criteria in the clause for the grant of permission – if there is to be an authorisation requirement then we believe that criteria should underline the importance of freedom of expression and assembly in Parliament Square.
12. While we do not object in principle to the restriction of the use of tents and other sleeping equipment in Parliament Square, we do have some concerns about the methods by which the Bill restricts these activities. The power to seize property in clause 147, in so far as it applies to sleeping equipment, should not be used against

---

<sup>1</sup> Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill, Briefing on Parts 3-6 for House of Lords Second Reading, March 2005.

homeless people lest it remove their only material for shelter. Further, the court's power on conviction under cl 148 to make any 'such other order as the court considers appropriate for the purpose of preventing P from engaging in any prohibited activity in the controlled area of Parliament Square' is overbroad and could lead to disproportionate orders in breach of Articles 10 and 11 European Convention on Human Rights. In particular, the provision that the order 'may (in particular) require P not to enter the controlled area of Parliament Square for such period as may be specified in the order' gives rise to serious concern. The importance of freedom of expression and assembly near Parliament – at the heart of our democracy – is such that restricting access in this way will rarely be justified. Parliament Square is a public place well served by police officers and anyone attempting to carry out a prohibited activity can be quickly seen and apprehended. It is therefore hard to imagine when it would be necessary to prohibit entry to the square per se. Bearing in mind that these provisions will be targeted at demonstrators, it is of great importance to the democratic process that provisions aimed at preventing the setting up of camps do not have the by-product of silencing their protests all together. We therefore believe that orders under s148 should not be able to bar entry to Parliament Square.

#### Suggested amendments

**Page 98, line 28 [clause 146], leave out from 'the end' to 'specified,' in line 31**

**Page 98, line 31 [clause 146] leave out '90 days' and insert '48 hours'**

**Page 98, line 33 [clause 146], leave out paragraph**

**Page 100, line 1 [clause 148], leave out paragraph and insert:**

**“( ) However, an order under subsection (1) (b) may not prohibit a person from entering the controlled area of Parliament Square nor restrict their right lawfully to demonstrate there.”**

#### Effect

The first three amendments above, taken together, would provide that instead of a direction under clause 145 remaining in force for a period specified up to 90 days or for 90 days if no period was specified, that all such directions should remain in force for 48 hours. This period

would still prevent illegal activity but would provide a much more proportionate restriction of activities in Parliament Square.

We are concerned that the making of orders under clause 148 to prevent camps, etc, in Parliament Square should not as a by-product bar a person entirely from the square and therefore prevent him/her from protesting lawfully there. The importance of freedom of expression and assembly near Parliament – at the heart of our democracy – is such that restricting access in this way will rarely be justified. Parliament Square is a public place well served by police officers and anyone attempting to carry out a prohibited activity can be quickly seen and apprehended. It is therefore hard to imagine when it would be necessary to prohibit entry to the square per se. The fourth amendment above would therefore prevent clause 148 orders from excluding a person from Parliament Square or restricting their right *lawfully* to protest there.

## **PART 4 – MISCELLANEOUS**

### **Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs**

13. Clause 154 would amend the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 in order to remove the requirement on the Secretary of State to appoint certain categories of person to the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs – those with wide and recent experience in medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine, pharmacy, the pharmaceutical industry and chemistry – and those with wide and recent experience of social problems connected with the misuse of drugs. We believe that the Advisory Council is an important independent expert body whose recommendations can provide a rational basis for the classification of drugs under the 1971 Act, and that the passing of this clause could lead to the compromising of the Council's independence and scientific acumen. We therefore believe that it should be removed from the Bill.

### **Arrest warrants**

14. Clause 155 of the Bill seeks to remove the ability of private individuals to seek and obtain arrest warrants against those accused of international crimes including (inter alia) torture, war crimes, piracy and hijacking, unless the Director of Public Prosecutions gives his consent. Similar proposals were made by the Labour

government before the general election. We believe that these proposals are misguided and are contrary to the international rule of law.

15. Two reasons have been cited for this change in the law. The first is that warrants have been sought against officials from states with whom the UK enjoys good diplomatic relations. The Ministry of Justice consultation paper on the topic stated that:<sup>2</sup>

There is reason to believe that some people, including people with whom the British Government needs to engage in discussion, may not be prepared to visit this country for fear that a private arrest warrant might be sought against them.

16. Concerns have also been raised at the evidential standard applied on applications for warrants. The consultation stated:<sup>3</sup>

The issue of a summons or warrant means that criminal proceedings against the suspect have begun, and it can be done on the basis of far less evidence than the CPS would require in order to charge, or than would be needed before a jury could properly convict.

17. In relation to the 'friendly states' question it should firstly be born in mind that immunity from prosecution for war crimes and crimes against humanity applies in relation to government officials enjoy state immunity from prosecution for international crimes,<sup>4</sup> including sitting heads of state, and serving heads of government, foreign ministers, defence ministers and diplomats. A private application for the arrest of Israeli Defence Minister General Shaul Mofaz in February 2004 was refused by the Bow Street Magistrates for precisely this reason. Such officials are therefore free to visit the UK without let or hindrance.

18. In relation to evidence, it should be borne in mind that applications for private arrest warrants are scrutinised by specialist District Judges at the City of Westminster

---

<sup>2</sup> *Arrest Warrants – Universal Jurisdiction. Note by the Ministry of Justice* (undated, 2010), p3.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p2.

<sup>4</sup> Save where the arrest warrant has been requested by the International Criminal Court: see article 27 of the Rome Statute and sections 2(3) and 23 of the International Criminal Court Act 2001.

Magistrates' Court (who also deal with terrorism and extradition cases). The court will issue a warrant if persuaded not only that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been committed but also that there is admissible evidence which could, if uncontradicted, establish the elements of the offence(s). Warrants are not, therefore, issued frivolously.

19. Private parties including solicitors and non-governmental organisations may be in a better position than the Metropolitan police and CPS units responsible for investigating and prosecuting these offences to both receive complaints from victims and build up dossiers of evidence in the first instance. Both the Metropolitan police Anti-Terrorist Unit and the CPS Counter-Terrorism Division responsible for dealing with these offences are, as their names suggest, responsible for investigating and prosecuting terrorist offences and their resources are stretched in attempting also to deal with war crimes, crimes against humanity etc. There is a need to act quickly in some cases and we are concerned that the requirement for the DPP's consent could allow suspects to evade justice in these circumstances. In his evidence to the Public Bill Committee, the DPP said:<sup>5</sup>

**Q 57 Dr Huppert:** You talked about very fast responses. Realistically, how quickly could you respond? If somebody said, "A plane's landing in a few hours," would it be realistic to expect you to carry out even a threshold test within that time?

**Keir Starmer:** It depends, but it is pretty unlikely. In our most recent example we were asked, with 24 hours to go, to look at a file, and we did. We continued to look at it after the various applications began to be made. It is quite a big ask, however, because these are serious offences with serious consequences. Often the evidence that has been gathered will be in lever-arch files rather than envelopes, and technical rules of admissibility must be considered.

We are engaging with the main groups who are most concerned and we are encouraging them to come to us early, because if we can avoid the late situation, so much the better. We have agreed to have a live walk-through of a typical case with them, which I hope will be useful, so that they can understand better what the rules of evidence will be and what our constraints are. So, there is a lot of up-front preparation and engagement.

We have lawyers who are—and will be—available to work at short notice. However, if we are put on two hours' notice of somebody landing and are given two or three lever-arch files, it is pretty unlikely that we will be able to get through that exercise.

---

<sup>5</sup> Public Bill Committee, 4<sup>th</sup> sitting, 20 January 2011, columns 125-126.

20. Further, the right of private citizens to seek arrest warrants for suspected war criminals serves as a valuable corrective against what Lord Wilberforce described as 'inertia or partiality on the part of authority'.<sup>6</sup> A finding by a magistrate that there exists *prima facie* evidence that a suspect has committed war crimes,<sup>7</sup> sufficient to justify the issuance of a warrant for his or her arrest, must never be lightly dismissed. In particular, an independent judicial determination of this kind may serve as a spur to governmental action. More generally, it may also serve to promote the democratic accountability of the executive.
21. We therefore believe that this proposed change in the law is unnecessary, sends the wrong signal to the international community and may allow suspects in some cases to evade justice due to delay. The UK must not be allowed to become a safe haven for international criminals. We note further that the provisions of the Bill, while applying to many international crimes, are not extended to genocide and question why, if the DPP's consent is not needed for a genocide arrest, it should be needed in relation to torture, war crimes, or piracy?
22. We therefore believe that clause 155 should be removed from the Bill. We further believe that the DPP, who is independent of government, should make decisions as to the prosecution of suspects for international crimes, rather than the Attorney General, and suggest an amendment below to bring about this change.

## Amendment

### **New clause**

---

<sup>6</sup> Lord Wilberforce, *Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers* [1978] AC 435: 'Enforcement of the law means that any person who commits the relevant offence is prosecuted. The individual ... who wishes to see the law enforced has a remedy of his own: he can bring a private prosecution. *This historical right ... goes right back to the earliest days of our legal system...*' [emphasis added]. See also at 497 per Lord Diplock: 'In English public law every citizen still has the right, as he once had a duty (though of imperfect obligation), to invoke the aid of courts of criminal jurisdiction for the enforcement of the criminal law by this procedure'.

<sup>7</sup> Or the other offences for which there is universal jurisdiction under UK law, e.g. torture, genocide and crimes against humanity. For the sake of convenience, all references to 'war crimes' and 'war criminals' in this response should be read as a generic reference to any of the relevant offences of universal jurisdiction.

- (1) Proceedings for an offence to which this subsection applies shall not be instituted without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
- (2) The consent of the Attorney General or the Attorney General for Northern Ireland shall not be required for the institution of proceedings for an offence to which subsection (1) applies.
- (3) Subsection (1) applies to –
  - (a) piracy or an offence under section 2 of the Piracy Act 1837 (piracy where murder is attempted)
  - (b) an offence under section 1 of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (grave breaches of Geneva conventions);
  - (c) an offence under section 1 of the Internationally Protected Persons Act 1978 (attacks and threats of attacks on protected persons)
  - (d) an offence under section 1 of the Taking of Hostages Act 1982 (hostage-taking);
  - (e) an offence under section 1, 2 or 6 of the Aviation Security Act 1982 (hijacking etc);
  - (f) an offence under any of sections 1 to 2A of the Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983 (offences relating to nuclear material);
  - (g) an offence under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (torture);
  - (h) an offence under section 1 of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 (endangering safety at aerodromes);
  - (i) an offence under sections 9 to 14 of that Act (hijacking ships etc);
  - (j) an offence under any of sections 1 to 3 of the United Nations Personnel Act 1997 (attacks on UN workers etc)

### Effect

We propose in this amendment that the Attorney General's role in consenting to prosecution for international crimes should be removed and that the DPP should instead fulfil that role for the offences listed in our new suggested clause (which are slightly broader than those in clause 155 of the Bill due to the different nature of the discretion suggested).

**JUSTICE**  
**June 2011**