



A pro-innovation approach to AI regulation

**Department for
Science, Innovation
& Technology**

Consultation

Response

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Introduction

1. JUSTICE is a cross-party law reform and human rights organisation working to strengthen the justice system. It is the UK section of the International Commission of Jurists. Our vision is of fair, accessible and equal legal processes in which the individual's rights are protected and which reflect the country's international reputation for upholding and promoting the rule of law.
2. This submission sets out JUSTICE's response to the Government's White Paper, "A pro-innovation approach to AI regulation" (the "**Consultation**") presented by the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology ("**DSIT**").¹
3. JUSTICE recognises that Artificial Intelligence ("**AI**") has the potential to radically change our society and the way we live our lives. We embrace the opportunities of AI, but alongside this we must anticipate and mitigate a range of risks. In the context of the law and justice, this involves asking some important questions: what does a human rights and a rule of law approach to AI look like? What is the role of the courts in ensuring accountability in AI? What are the opportunities and challenges to the use of AI in law enforcement, the courts and legal services? How can we ensure AI enhances, and does not undermine, access to justice and the rule of law? JUSTICE has recently established a new workstream dedicated to "AI and the Law" to consider these questions. In the coming months, we will establish a new Working Party of experts to assess these challenges, thereafter producing a series of pragmatic and evidence-based policy recommendations.
4. JUSTICE's response to the Consultation has five key messages:
 - i) **AI can provide many benefits. However, it can also pose risks to human rights, democracy and the rule of law:** risk-based governance is required to effectively protect individuals and society from irresponsible AI design, development and deployment. We suggest that human rights, democracy and the rule of law should be explicitly embedded principles in that governance.
 - ii) **Clear regulation supports innovation:** establishing guardrails and legal duties will improve legal certainty and inspire confidence and trust for private and public AI actors, users and those subject to AI decision-making processes.

¹ DSIT, "[A pro-innovation approach to AI regulation](#)" (29 March 2023)

- iii) **A statutory duty is necessary:** it would oblige AI actors to act responsibly throughout the AI life cycle, whereas optional ethical guidelines do not provide reliable, consistent, or enforceable standards. Meanwhile the existing legal landscape is a patchwork of different private and public rights and liabilities, which does not sufficiently secure accountability for the proposed AI principles.
- iv) **Transparency is a “gateway” principle:** opacity undermines the ability for civil society and directly impacted individuals to assess the safety and fairness of AI systems, and in turn undermines the accountability and contestability of AI.
- v) **If the regulation of AI is going to be primarily through existing sectoral regulators, a central body is critical.** Its functions should include identifying gaps in governance and could additionally provide a central public engagement function.

Questions

1. Do you agree that requiring organisations to make it clear when they are using AI would adequately ensure transparency?

5. JUSTICE does not agree that this would adequately ensure transparency. Transparency is a ***procedural and governing principle***, as opposed to the principles of fairness and safety, which govern the ***quality*** of AI systems.² While fairness and safety require that AI systems do not harm or discriminate, transparency secures the ability to scrutinise fairness or safety in the first place.
6. Other procedural and governing principles are accountability and contestability. These are critical to allocate responsibility for and remedy unfair or unsafe AI. But again, without transparency, the ability of individuals to access those mechanisms effectively is undermined. **Transparency can therefore be understood as a “gateway” principle.**
7. Given this important role, JUSTICE is concerned by the suggestion that transparency could be adequately secured through notification when AI is being deployed. This will mean the principle has no practical impact on the previous stages of the AI life cycle, i.e. the design and development of AI systems. Instead, we urge DSIT to consider a range of practical transparency measures throughout the design and development stages of AI. Possible measures are provided in response to Question 2.

² See analysis in David Leslie, [Understanding artificial intelligence ethics and safety: A guide for the responsible design and implementation of AI systems in the public sector](#) (The Alan Turing Institute, 2019), p.13.

2. What other transparency measures would be appropriate, if any?

8. As explained above, JUSTICE considers transparency should be secured at each stage of the AI life cycle. This will enable accountability of each actor at each stage by enhancing the ability of individuals and society to analyse the fairness and safety of the AI system.

- a. **Design transparency:** At the design stage, proactive measures include stakeholder consultations and impact assessments (including harm, data protection, equality and human rights) when the problems are being formulated, the objectives are being set, and the data selection is taking place. These measures would be conducted by those commissioning the AI (such as police seeking to design new risk assessment AI tools) and any private technology companies they are working with. Transparency of these processes will allow regulators and individuals to scrutinise poorly designed AI systems, whether it be too few perspectives in the formulation of a problem, poorly defined objectives, or biased, inappropriate or unrepresentative data selections.

Data set transparency is also an important consideration; disposing of data on which the AI is trained undermines transparency and the ability of individuals to hold AI actors to account. However, individuals' data protection and privacy rights must be protected. The challenge is to do so whilst not abandoning the principle of data transparency; procedures which require data selection by AI actors to be justified to regulators in advance; while anonymisation and limiting access may provide further possible ways of providing data transparency in cases in which the risk demands it, but also demands protection of privacy.³ JUSTICE intends to consider this further in the context of the justice system in our ongoing work.

- b. **Development transparency:** Measures include audits by regulators, and mandatory disclosure by AI developers of their testing and validation information. Again public consultation can inform the choices and adjustments being made. Documenting development processes enhances accountability by capturing the foreseen risks, the sufficiency of testing prior to deployment, and justifications of development choices, for example choosing an unexplainable algorithmic model.

³ For example, live facial recognition software which automatically deletes faces which do not trigger an alert, cannot be assessed for its overall bias, as was the case in *R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales* [2020] EWCA Civ 1058, see para 191.

Again there may be challenges to the disclosure of these development documents. However this should not be a barrier to transparency; appropriate to the level of public impact and/or risk, there may be appropriate concessions, like summaries, for low risk areas, or a need for regulatory powers to override commercial concerns about disclosure of documents for high risk AI.

- c. **Deployment transparency:** Ongoing testing post-deployment should be transparent and should be an ongoing concern; transparency is not “completed” when the product is deployed. Publicly accessible registers can provide a one-stop, comprehensive and authoritative account of AI use. Public and private registers pose different considerations. Accountability and transparency in the exercise of state power are protected by the rule of law and **JUSTICE supports a mandatory public body register of AI.**⁴ Private bodies will have different contractual and intellectual property considerations. However, this should not be a reason for registers to be dismissed and JUSTICE considers they are likely to be desirable for areas of high public impact/ risk.

3. Do you agree that current routes to contestability or redress for AI-related harms are adequate?

9. The Consultation defines contestability and redress as ensuring that “[w]here appropriate, users, impacted third parties and actors in the AI life cycle [are able to] to contest an AI decision or outcome that is harmful or creates material risk of harm.”⁵ It clarifies that “[t]he UK’s initial non-statutory approach will not create new rights or new routes to redress at this stage.”⁶
10. This principle should be understood, in JUSTICE’s view, as securing access to justice and the rule of law with respect to AI decision-making processes.⁷ Access to justice is

⁴ JUSTICE highlights the work of the Public Law Project in attempting to create an algorithm register for government automated tools, based on ascertainable information and targeted investigations for example through freedom of information requests. The register rates the majority of Government AI use to be “low transparency”, with over three quarters of the tools requiring freedom of information requests to be uncovered or understood. See [Track Automated Government \(“TAG”\) register](#).

⁵ Consultation, box under para 52.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ See our response to Question 6 in terms of how the current principles could be strengthened with respect to explicitly embedding human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

fundamental to the rule of law, as is the ability to challenge arbitrary exercise of state power.⁸ This includes the right to have notice of the case against you;⁹ to be heard and have the opportunity to meet the case against you;¹⁰ to have a hearing free from bias;¹¹ and access to courts.¹² The concepts are mirrored in procedural human rights, such as the right to a fair trial and the right to an effective remedy.¹³

11. However, the first stage of contesting a decision need not be the courts. While internal review processes must not replace access to a court, they can provide a faster and cheaper way of remedying mistakes. This is already secured in some areas. For example, under data protection law, automated decision making which will have a legal or similar effect on a data subject is only permissible in certain circumstances,¹⁴ such as when the data subject has consented, or automation is necessary to enter into or perform a contract. Even then, an individual has the right to obtain human intervention, to express their point of view and to contest the decision.¹⁵ For example, a mortgage applicant may go through an automated application process to be offered only high rate deals, or be refused. That applicant should be able to challenge the outcome, not initially to a court but to the mortgage company, make representations, for example about their good credit score, and have a human scrutinise and, if necessary, override the automated decision.
12. Otherwise, there are established legal routes to enforce existing civil legal rights and obligations, to challenge evidence submitted in a criminal case, and to challenge the lawfulness of public bodies' decision-making through the administrative justice system.
13. A comprehensive analysis of all routes of redress is impossible within the timescale of this Consultation. That said, the sufficiency of such routes in light of emerging AI challenges, and how to protect the rule of law and access to justice within them, will be a key ongoing area of inquiry for JUSTICE in our work.

⁸ Two of the five key aspects to the Rule of Law as set out in Council of Europe, *Rule of Law Checklist*, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session (March 2016). See also the eight principles identified in Thomas Bingham *The Rule of Law* (2010).

⁹ *R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Doody* [1993] UKHL 8, [1994] 1 AC 531.

¹⁰ *Ridge v Baldwin* [1963] UKHL 2, [1964] AC 40.

¹¹ *Dimes v Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal* (1852) 3 HL Cas 759, (1852) 10 ER 301.

¹² *R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Leech (No 2)* [1993] EWCA Civ 12, [1994] QB 198.

¹³ Articles 6 and 13 respectively of the European Convention of Human Rights ("**ECHR**").

¹⁴ Article 22(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation ("**GDPR**").

¹⁵ Article 22(3), GDPR.

14. Before which, JUSTICE suggests the question must be approached with scepticism; it must not be assumed that existing contestability and redress mechanisms are “adequate”. Indeed, given the rapid advances in AI technology, even those seen in the last six months, we consider it extremely unlikely that there will not be novel challenges to our current redress systems posed by AI, whilst existing problems risk being exacerbated.

15. We therefore highlight the following preliminary considerations.

- i) **Regulators currently have different processes, powers and capacities to respond to complaints, conduct disciplinary procedures and enforce decisions and remedies.** This means that inconsistency is unavoidable, and DSIT must review on an ongoing basis issues surrounding inadequate powers and capacity issues, with a view to establishing best practice.
- ii) **Unregulated actors are likely to have insufficient internal processes for redress.** They may have processes to meet their existing data protection duties as set out above, but AI actors are not required to provide review processes outside of those circumstances, for example when decisions which are AI-assisted, rather than entirely autonomous, regardless of the quality of the human review and the sufficiency of their knowledge about the AI system.
- iii) **Contestability and redress in the private sphere will cross both regulated and unregulated actors, and involve a wide range of applicable law,** often highly dependent on the context in which the AI is being used. Well established concerns about the accessibility of civil justice, particularly through the cuts to legal aid,¹⁶ will also be highly relevant to the adequacy of access to redress.
- iv) **The administrative legal system will have a crucial role in providing contestability and redress for public sector use;** again access has been worsened by recent legislation, which will hamper not enhance access to redress.¹⁷ The system will likely benefit from an end-to-end needs assessment to identify differences in reviewing the legality of AI decisions as opposed to human decisions,

¹⁶ Civil legal aid has been almost entirely eradicated in England and Wales, since the legal aid cuts implemented in 2013 by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. See for example the Law Society's "[legal aid deserts](#)" [maps](#) in England and Wales.

¹⁷ Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022

and any changes required from court and tribunal procedures and resources to meet those needs.

- v) **The criminal justice system has both the most complex rules of evidence and may encounter some of the highest-risk AI in its prosecution evidence (for example, police facial recognition evidence).** Processes will benefit from a review of adequacy of processes, for example disclosure, access to expert knowledge and opportunities for challenge.

- vi) **Multiple routes of redress, internal, through regulators and through the courts and tribunals, will likely be confusing for individuals who want to seek redress but do not know where to go.** There is a risk that this disproportionately impacts those who are disadvantaged, vulnerable or marginalised. JUSTICE strongly advocates in all its work for justice systems to be user-focused, designed around the individual users who need them. The ongoing question of how the principle of contestability can be given practical effect across the vast array of possible AI uses should have this user-focus at its core.

6. What, if anything, is missing from the revised principles?

16. The Consultation makes a brief reference to equality and human rights in the context of the principle of fairness.¹⁸ Neither access to justice nor the rule of law are mentioned with respect to any of the principles nor the way in which they ought to be interpreted. **JUSTICE considers more can be done to embed the existing and established norms of human rights, democracy and rule of law into the principles.**

17. There are several use cases of AI which already demonstrate risks in these areas.

- i) Facial or voice recognition AI may infringe an individual's right to bodily privacy and human dignity, the latter being the core value underlying all human rights.¹⁹ They may

¹⁸ Consultation, box under para 52.

¹⁹ The courts have confirmed live facial recognition systems engage Article 8 in *R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales* [2020] EWCA Civ 1058

also have a chilling effect on the right to public assembly, freedom of expression, and the general use of public space.²⁰

- ii) Opaque and unexplainable systems could breach the common law principle of natural justice, which includes “*audi alteram partem*”: being able to know and respond to the case against you.²¹
- iii) AI systems can reflect and exacerbate existing bias and discrimination within society, resulting in discriminatory outcomes. The COMPAS tool used in the US to assist with criminal sentencing gives a score of “risk” based on several data points about the individual, including characteristics and personal history. An investigation by non-profit news organisation, Propublica, found that black defendants were more likely than white defendants to receive a “false positive” from the tool, i.e. be incorrectly judged to be at a higher risk of recidivism, while white defendants were more likely than black defendants to receive a false negative, i.e. be incorrectly flagged as low risk.²² In this example, the AI system undermined not only the individuals’ equality, but their equality before the law, another fundamental aspect to the rule of law.
- iv) Judicial use of AI systems to assist decision-making, especially closed or unexplainable systems, could undermine judicial independence, a key tenet of the rule of law. Again, the use of COMPAS has been controversial for this reason, since the tool is “closed source” and its results are unexplainable.

18. Of course, it is important to highlight the many ways in which AI can benefit access to justice, human rights and the rule of law:

- i) AI systems can provide automated, faster and cheaper access to legal information and advice. This can be harnessed for the benefit of the most disadvantaged in society who currently do not have the means or legal empowerment to assert their rights, hold state misuse of power to account and access justice.

²⁰ See House of Lords Justice and Home Affairs Committee, [Technology Rules? The advent of new technologies in the justice system](#), 1st Report of Session 2021-22 - published 30 March 2022 - HL Paper 180, para 22.

²¹ *Ridge v Baldwin* [1964] AC 40.

²² See Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu and Lauren Kirchner, ‘[Machine Bias](#)’ and ‘[How we analysed the COMPAS recidivism algorithm](#)’, *Propublica* (23 May 2016).

- ii) AI systems can link and analyse huge amounts of data, providing new insights into what we know about how certain groups access, or are prevented from accessing, services, including the justice system.
- iii) AI can also be used to analyse large data sets of decisions, and thereafter highlight inconsistent, biased or arbitrary decision-making practices.

19. However, JUSTICE considers these benefits to society can only be optimised if AI actors are fully aware of the risks to human rights, democracy and the rule of law and incorporate that approach into their roles in designing, developing and deploying AI.

20. The need is acute for both public and private actors. Public actors directly exercise power over individuals, and their legitimacy is only maintained through safeguarding the rights and freedoms of individuals, democratic values and by being accountable through the rule of law. Explicit inclusion of these concepts therefore then reflects the power and responsibility of public actors in their use of AI.

21. The need is different for private actors. Since they are not directly liable under current legal frameworks for human rights violations,²³ they may not be used to incorporating human rights considerations into their processes. Similarly, impacts of their actions on the rule of law or democracy may not be familiar concepts. Instead, narrow conceptions of the “fairness” principle may follow, in the context of their current direct legal liability, rather than in the context of the potential impacts of their actions on society and the rights and freedoms of others.

22. Of course, if that tool is then used by a public body, or approved by a regulator, then a human rights challenge could be brought; meanwhile other direct actions could be brought against private AI actors. However, JUSTICE suggests that the aim of governance and of these principles should be to provide a framework through which AI actors can act confidently to **avoid** these risks on society and individuals. Therefore, JUSTICE suggests the right risk-based approach is to embed these concepts horizontally, throughout the AI life cycle. This will improve the quality of AI being produced across public and private sectors, and prevent rights violations from occurring in the first place, rather than rather than relying on remedial action after violations have occurred.

²³ Unless their functions are of a public nature, per section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. See further *R (Heather) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation* [2002] EWCA Civ 336; *Aston Cantlow PCC v Wallbank* [2003] UKHL 37; and *YL v Birmingham City Council and others* [2007] UKHL 27.

23. Therefore, **JUSTICE suggests the norms of human rights, democracy and the rule of law should be explicitly embedded into the principles.**

24. There is a clear example for doing so in progress; the Draft Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law, currently under development by the Council of Europe's Committee on Artificial Intelligence ("**CAI**").²⁴ In JUSTICE's view, the Draft Convention better roots AI principles in human rights, democracy and rule of law, by extending the concepts to both public and private context. The principles included, in addition to those similar to the Consultation principles, include: individual freedom, human dignity and autonomy; access to public debate and inclusive democratic processes. The Convention also adds further principles: preservation of public health and the environment; safe innovation; appropriate public consultation in the light of social, economic, ethical and legal implications; and the promotion of digital literacy and digital skills for all segments of the population.²⁵

25. JUSTICE finally notes the benefits in the future if our domestic principles align with international standards. The Committee has 46 member states, of which the UK is a member and provides a Bureau function, and 6 observer states.²⁶ Particularly, given the reach of the Draft Convention to private actors as well as public actors, the consistency this would offer would benefit UK businesses when competing internationally.

7. Do you agree that introducing a statutory duty on regulators to have due regard to the principles would clarify and strengthen regulators' mandates to implement our principles, while retaining a flexible approach to implementation?

26. JUSTICE considers a statutory duty would i) support innovation; ii) increase public trust and confidence; and iii) safeguard against risks of irresponsible and unregulated AI systems.

²⁴ Council of Europe, [Revised Zero Draft \[Framework\] Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law](#), 6 January 2023 CAI(2023)01. See further the primer for the Committee's predecessor, the Ad Hoc Committee on Artificial Intelligence ("CAHAI"), which laid foundations for the approach, authored by the Alan Turing Institute. David Leslie, Christopher Burr, Mhairi Aitken, Josh Cows, Mike Katell, and Morgan Briggs, [Artificial intelligence, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law: a primer](#). (The Council of Europe, 2021).

²⁵ Draft Articles 9 – 18.

²⁶ Canada, Holy See, Israel, Japan, Mexico, United States of America.

27. Firstly, the Consultation proposes to proceed with an approach to AI governance based on non-statutory principles, rather than legal obligations in primary legislation. The reasoning is as follows: “New rigid and onerous legislative requirements on businesses could hold back AI innovation and reduce our ability to respond quickly and in a proportionate way to future technological advances.”²⁷

28. JUSTICE does not consider a statutory duty based on the principles would be “rigid”. Moreover, JUSTICE questions the underlying assumption being made by the Consultation: that statutory regulation stifles innovation and economic growth. The recent Ryder Review²⁸ of the governance of biometric data made the following observation about such an assumption.

“Strong law and regulation is sometimes characterised as hindering advancements in the practical use of biometric data. This should not be the case. In practice a clear regulatory framework enables those who work with biometric data to be confident of the ethical and legal lines within which they must operate. They are freed from the unhelpful burden of self-regulation that arises from unclear guidelines and overly flexible boundaries. This confidence liberates innovation and encourages effective working practices. Lawmakers and regulators are not always helping those who want to act responsibly by taking a light touch”.

29. JUSTICE agrees, and considers the point to be as applicable to artificial intelligence as it is biometric data.²⁹

30. Secondly, JUSTICE highlights the potential benefit of a statutory duty on public trust and confidence in AI, which the Consultation states it wants to build.³⁰ According to a new national survey by the Ada Lovelace Institute and The Alan Turing Institute, when asked what would make them more comfortable with AI, 62% of adults surveyed said they would like to see laws and regulations guiding the use of AI technologies. 59% said that they would like clear procedures in place for appealing to a human against an AI decision.³¹

²⁷ Consultation, para 11.

²⁸ Matthew Ryder QC, [The Ryder Review: Independent legal review of the governance of biometric data in England and Wales](#) (Ada Lovelace Institute, 2022), p. 6.

²⁹ And indeed where the two overlap, such as live facial recognition technology.

³⁰ Consultation, throughout, eg. paras 5, 6, 8, 33, etc.

³¹ Roshini Modhvadia, [How do people feel about AI?](#) (Ada Lovelace Institute and The Alan Turing Institute, June 2023).

31. Thirdly, JUSTICE is concerned about the Consultation’s “wait and see approach” with regards to a statutory obligation, at a time of rapid acceleration in AI technology. Our concerns include the following risks.
32. Absent any enforceable obligations, AI actors may not safeguard against a range of harmful, discriminatory, or otherwise dangerous design elements or uses. For example, regulators may lack the capacity, leadership and powers to implement non-mandatory guidelines effectively.
33. The risk becomes especially palpable for public bodies, which may use such AI systems to make decisions about individuals’ lives, rights and entitlements without the obligation to uphold these specific AI principles. They will often do so outside the remit of a regulatory accountability mechanism. Whilst administrative legal frameworks are available, individuals will be unable to directly plead a specific breach if the AI principles.
34. Absent a legal duty, other legal frameworks are available and overlap. However they are a patchwork which is insufficient to cover all circumstances and challenges to AI actors for breaches of the principles: data protection law only protects personal data; human rights obligations are only enforceable against public bodies; and the requirement *not* to discriminate which is applicable to private actors is very different to the equality obligations on public bodies which require proactive action.³² Furthermore these legal frameworks do not provide consistent and sufficient means of enforcing transparency, which as JUSTICE has explained, is a **gateway principle** to the remaining AI principles.
35. Furthermore, AI experts have observed that “self-regulation” has already been tried, “did not work, [and] now voluntary alignment with ethical principles needs to be replaced by legal compliance with the law”.³³ The consultation lacks any analysis of voluntary approaches so far, when the decision on a statutory duty will be revisited, and what the Government will consider determinative of “need”.
36. There exist ample benefits to introducing a statutory duty to have due regard to the principles. This would maintain flexibility, since the approach is still principles-based and context-specific, but would better secure safe and fair AI for the public, specifically in the hands of unregulated actors and public bodies. By contrast, the **principles of**

³² The Public Sector Equality Duty, s.149 Equality Act 2010.

³³ Luciano Floridi, ‘The End of an Era: From Self-Regulation to Hard Law for the Digital Industry’ (2021) 34 *Philosophy & Technology* 619.

accountability, contestability, and redress are likely to be moot if there is no statutory obligation that individuals can rely upon to enforce their rights against regulators.

9. Do you agree that the functions outlined in section 3.3.1 would benefit our AI regulation framework if delivered centrally?

37. The Consultation proposes creating a central body to address the lack of “central coordination or oversight” and consequently “achieve the coherence and improved clarity” for the sector.³⁴ We agree, and consider such a central function necessary if the Government proceeds with the proposed decentralised AI governance model. However, JUSTICE questions whether this should be a Government body or rather whether it should function independently. This is something JUSTICE will consider in more detail in our ongoing programme of work.

10. What, if anything, is missing from the central functions?

38. JUSTICE wishes to highlight two functions: the need for ongoing gap analysis; and the potential public engagement role.

39. Firstly, the central body must monitor gaps in existing regulators, for example due to their capacity, powers, and/or lack of coherence in interpreting the principles. However this gap analysis must not be limited to existing regulators, since many AI actors will be unregulated. For example, human resources professionals are an unregulated profession. Notwithstanding, the potential for AI innovation, and risk, in human resources is huge, from automating recruitment processes, creating hierarchies of staff eligible for promotions, and automating decision-making in grievance procedures. To ensure high risk AI use is not without oversight, the central body must take responsibility for this ongoing gap analysis.

40. Secondly, JUSTICE promotes consideration of a public facing role for a central body. This would go beyond the “public education and awareness” function suggested, and provide a clearly visible “entry point” for the public. This could have the role of convening forums for public discussion, around the new practical, ethical and legal challenges posed by AI,

³⁴ Consultation para 70.

as well as the benefits and value it provides. It could also provide a point of access for individuals who want to challenge AI, **but do not know where to go**. A centralised “one stop shop” for AI complaints could be considered, which could provide information, advice and signposting.